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The state responds to the defendant's argument that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void 
for vagueness on its face by claiming that as long as some grammatically sound formulation can 
be extrapolated from the garbled language of the law at hand, the Constitution is satisfied. The 
state points to the various "reasonable" interpretations created by the District Court, and even 
finds acceptable the examples posited by the defendant. The Constitution, declares the state, 
requires that the people be given adequate notice, and breaking down clumps of nonsense words 
into understandable prohibitions is enough. 
The state's argument is attractive in that it provides the utmost protection to the law "'as 
is," and thus seems to protect the decisions of the legislative body and thereby the people that 
enacted it. However, the state's desired jurisprudence essentially died when the concept of the 
void for vagueness challenge was born. The void for vagueness challenge is about more than 
simply ensuring that the people and law enforcement know what the legislature intends. I n the 
words of Chief Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit: 
We should of course yield to the text, when the text is plain, but 'good order' is a 
word of vague content; particularly when used as an alternate to 'good moral 
character.' If it be answered that this bases our construction on our personal 
judgment of the public importance of the conduct involved, we agree. Not 
infrequently a legislature means to leave to the judges the appraisal of some of the 
values at stake. For example, those rights, criminal and civil, that are measured by 
what is 'reasonable,' really grant to courts such a 'legislative' power, although we 
call the issues questions of fact. They require of the judges the compromise that 
they think in accord with the general purposes of the measure as the community 
would understand it. We are of course aware of the resulting uncertainties 
involved in such an interpretation; but the alternative would be specifically to 
provide for each situation that can arise, a substitute utterly impractical in 
operation. We can say no more than that we think it plain that this statute did not 
mean to make naturalization depend upon obedience to such a regulation as that 
before us. We call this function 'interpretation,' so long as the scope of the 
appraisal and choice is not too wide; although when it is too wide, we call the 
statute invalid, as a 'delegation' oflegislative power. In the case at bar we hold 
that disobedience to the parking regulations of a great city, even though repeated 
and deliberate, does not show a disposition contrary to the 'good order' of the 
United States; and was a permissible delegation of power. 
Yin-Shing Woo v, US., 288 F,2d 434 (1961). When ajudge finds herself breaking down a 
criminal statute into understandable segments that do not even contain the language originally 
found in the law, as the District Judge had to do in this case, it is tantamount to admitting that the 
law as written was not understandable, and further, that the judge is making law. 
Particularly where, as here, the state finds itself arguing for contradictory interpretations 
of the same law, that law must be found void. (See Brief of Respondent at 6 adopting the District 
Court's interpretations and compare with p. 7 arguing that defendant's interpretations are 
reasonable as well.) The standard of clarity for a criminal law, above all, needs be higher than 
reasonable break downs of syntactically confusing run-on sentences, 
Lastly, the state's argument that the defendant had notice of what the law meant because 
a police officer told him of her interpretation of the ordinance is a rather odd argument that 
forgets that in our system of separated powers it is the judiciary and not the executive that 
decides what the law is. See Marbury v, Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), The officer's explanation 
is the reddest of herrings, and counsel for the defense is deeply troubled by the fact that the state 
keeps referring to it as if it had some talismanic power. 
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II. 
The state claims in response to the defendant's argument that the City of Spirit Lake went 
beyond the authority it had been granted in creating a monopoly of the delivery of city water that 
not only has the City created said monopoly but in fact the City has created a monopoly on the 
delivery of water. period. Brief of Respondent at 9. The state points to no authority that allows a 
municipality to pass such a law. The District Court never directly responded to the issue in its 
opinion. The District Court did find that criminal penalties could be used to benefit the 
corporation and its trade, commerce, and industry. Intermediate Appellate Opinion at II. 
The problem with the Court's formulation is that, while certainly the creation of a 
monopoly benefits whoever controls it, and the people of a particular town may decide that no 
one may be allowed water unless they pay for city water first, the choice to create that monopoly 
requires more direction from the state legislature than the statutes and constitutional sections the 
District Court relied on. See generally F. T C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System. Inc., No. 11 
1160. --- S.Ct. ----, 2013 WL 598434 at *6 (U.S.2013). The choice to essentially socialize water 
delivery and bring the might of the state to bear as has been done in Spirit Lake is one that per 
the precedents of the United States Supreme Court, need be made by a higher authority. It 
cannot be enough to say that the monopoly is good for the people. The free market, while not 
constitutionally guaranteed, cannot be so easily dismissed. Interstate businesses' interests will be 
affected by laws that essentially bar them from providing water to the residents of Spirit Lake. 
Decisions of this magnitude cannot be made at the local level alone. 
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III. 
The state argues in its response that the Constitutions of neither the country nor this state 
provide any protection for acts of charity. Aesop wrote that a tyrant will always find a 
justification for his tyranny. In this instance, the state simply relies on the fact that rules are 
rules. Indeed, that has been the theme of the rejections of the defendant's arguments and conduct 
since the case began. See Tr. Vol. I, p. 7, L. 9-16, Vol. II, p. 29, L. 6-12, p. 31, L. 1-4, p. 31, L. 
18-25, p. 32, L. 1-21, p. 159, L. 14-17; Intermediate Appellate Opinion at 12. 
The state dismisses the defendant's references to charity's place in the traditions of the 
American people as being unrelated to the Constitution. However, the Constitution does protect 
conduct "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." See Washington v. Giucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997). For complex reasons, rights once thought to be protected by the 
Ninth Amendment have been generally found to exist within the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Defense counsel admits that it can be difficult to say where in the 
Constitution rights are protected in view of modern jurisprudence, and thus he takes the safest 
route of relying on all of the relevant passages of the Constitution thought to protect the ordered 
liberties of our people. 
The District Court recognized that defense counsel is right. Intermediate Appellate 
Opinion at 12. The problem, from the perspective of this Court and the law, is how to define a 
right to provide charity such that it is a "'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest." Id The defendant has no need of a broad right in this case. A narrow finding that no 
government in the United States may criminalize the free distribution of water would suffice. 
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The government and Court's concern for the safety of the people is presumably answered 
through regulation, much like the regulation of speech and firearms. But to I iterally ban, punish, 
and label criminal the giving of water to a child who is without is monstrous. 
Counsel for the defendant will not irk the state by quoting from the Bible a second time. 
He will, however, point this Court to a relevant passage from Tertullian's Apologeticus, L.: 
Plures efJicimur quotiens melimur a vobis: semen est sanguis Christianorum. I 
Thomas Jefferson made similar warning.2 See Letter to William Stephens Smith (13 November 
1787). The kernel of truth in these declarations is that when one oppresses the deeply held 
values and beliefs of a people not only does that oppression accomplish nothing, it backfires. 
The Constitution is a contract between the people of the United States and their government. It 
is unreasonable to believe that they allowed the government the power to oppress their deeply 
held values and traditions when they ratified that document. 
The defendant also points again to the Idaho Constitution. Recent developments at the 
national level leave some with the suspicion that the federal Constitution has been decoupled 
from morality. The Idaho Supreme Court has never given up the responsibility placed upon our 
state's government under Article I § I of the Idaho Constitution to heed the ethics and morality 
of its people. This Court should rely on it to find that the ordinance as applied in this matter was 
in violation of the traditions and values of the people ofIdaho and the conviction cannot stand. 
I We multiply whenever we are mown down by you: the blood of Christians is the seed. 
2 And what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people 
preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and pacify 
them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with 
the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure. 
5 
IV. 
The state argues that the defendant cannot complain of the instruction for the elements of 
the ordinance at issue because he consented to them. However, the state must remember that the 
defendant had attacked the statute and made the argument as to what he believed the ordinance 
should be read to mean at the motions hearing held on January 3.2013. Also. at that hearing. the 
Magistrate issued a ruling as to what the ordinance meant. Tr Vol. I, p. 26. L. 22-25. p. 27, L. J-
17. The defendant, relying on the law of the case, had no objection to the use of the Magistrate 
Court's formulation of the ordinance, inasmuch as the existence of that formulation was but-for 
the defendant's argument that the ordinance did not apply to him. The defendant did not waive 
that earlier objection; he was simply recognizing that the issue had already been ruled upon. 
The state then argues that the defendant's interpretation of the statute, even if correct, 
does not mean that the instruction was incorrect. Since a quick comparison of the elements 
instruction given and the defendant's interpretation of the statute would reveal the rather 
important lack of instructing the jury that the defendant could only be guilty had he permitted 
connection or delivery of city water from the city's water distribution system, counsel for the 
defendant does not follow the state's reasoning. The elements instruction is for an entirely 
different crime. And regardless of the state's protest to the contrary, the issue as to what the 
proper elements of a criminal law are is not a question of whether to dismiss a case outright per 
I.C.R. 48, but a question of how to properly instruct ajury. See generally Slale v. Alley, --- P.3d 
----, 2014 WL 521457 at *8-*9 (Ct.App.2014). 
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The state responds along the same lines to the defendant's appeal of the denial of his 
proffered instruction as to what is city property. The defendant recognizes that these two issues 
are linked, but reiterates that the jury would have been better served by being allowed to see all 
that the law stated. As to the accusations the state makes that the defendant somehow changed 
the law for his instruction, the defendant simply asks the court to look at his requested 
Instruction Six. It is exactly what the state argues that the law is. 
v. 
The state finally argues that the defendant failed to establish that he did not get his water 
from someone besides Spirit Lake. Fortunately for the defendant, that was not his burden. 
Rather, the question is simply whether a reasonable trier of fact would convict on the facts in 
evidence. State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 355 (1996). There was no evidence that the 
defendant received water from the City of Spirit Lake. Try as it might, the state cannot 
overcome the reasonable possibility left open by the state's case that the water did not come from 
the City of Spirit Lake. Thus, the conviction must be overturned. 
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